



SPECIAL  
COLLECTIONS



DOUGLAS  
LIBRARY

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY  
AT KINGSTON

KINGSTON ONTARIO CANADA

Canada: p. 20



# A VINDICATION

OF THE

Present M— —y,

FROM

The Clamours rais'd against  
them upon occasion of the  
NEW PRELIMINARIES.

---

*Whoever would frighten us with the Expence and  
Tediouſness of ſuch a War, either are not ſen-  
ſible of our Danger, or if they are, they draw a  
poiſon'd Arrow out of a French Quiver.*

*Such a Peace (upon the ſuppoſition we could warrant  
it) is to be rejected with Scorn and Indignation by  
every true Engliſhman, as being both diſhonourable  
and deſtructive to his Country.*

Anguis in Hærbæ,

---

L O N D O N,

Printed in the Year M. DCC. XI.



## *A VINDICATION of the Present M———y, &c.*

**A**MONG the many restless Endeavours of the Ruin'd Party to sink the Reputation of the present M———y, there is none in which they discover their Good-will to them more than in the Violence they shew in attacking the new Preliminaries; which, tho they are such weak wretched things that they must fall of themselves, without any opposition made to them, yet these angry Men run upon them with all their might, and with the greatest Strength of Argument oppose Articles which no serious Man can think worthy of an Answer. A Man must have the meanest Opinion of the M———y, not to be sure such trifling Preliminaries can't be the Result of the Negotiations, which have been of late so much talk'd of: for an impartial Eye will discern in them at first sight most evident marks of their being spurious; and yet a certain Party take such pleasure in insulting the present M———y, that they set themselves against these Articles in great earnest, as if our All depended on them, without the least enquiry, whether they are genuine or not.

This is such unfair Treatment of a M———y who have deserv'd so much of the Nation in so short a time, that 'tis but a piece of common



Justice to them, to undeceive the World in this point, and let them see how groundless the Clamours are, that with so much industry and noise are rais'd against them on this account : and I doubt not, but the Reasons that have convinc'd me of the Spuriousness of these Preliminaries, will have the same effect on all impartial Men, and satisfy them, that nothing can be a greater Reflection on the M——y, than to impute to them such wretched Articles.

There is an obvious Prejudice that arises against these Articles from the very Stile of them. For if they were drawn up by Mr. *Mesnager* on the part of *France*, they were drawn, no doubt, in *French* ; and those which go about, are a Translation only : and if so, one would naturally expect to find in them some *Gallicisms*, some Footsteps of the *French* Language, some of those Signs and Marks, by which Translations seldom fail to discover themselves. And yet if we examine these Articles never so narrowly, we shall find every thing in them, besides the Sense, intirely *English* : and I dare say, that is the Language they were originally penn'd in. This I take to be a good presumptive Proof, that these Articles are not genuine.

But there is another thing observable in the Stile of them, that confirms me still more in this Suspicion ; and that is the loose, general, ambiguous manner that runs thro all of them, which makes it impossible to fix a determinate Sense upon any one of them, or say precisely, what they mean. Besides, there is in two or three of them, an Expression, which as the *French* Language won't bear, so we have by long Experience reason to look upon it as a Jest in the mouth of a *French* Minister, and that is *bona fide*, a thing they have been strangers to, time  
out



out of mind. This Argument perhaps may by some be thought to make against me; and it will be said that the more ambiguous and prevaricating the Articles are, the more likely are they to be genuine: 'tis agreeable to the Character of the *French*, and to what they have taught us to expect from them. True, 'tis no strange thing in a *French* Minister to shuffle and prevaricate, and make use of obscure, doubtful, or uncertain Terms. A *Frenchman*, I will allow, is capable of offering such Articles; but it would be strange, very strange in any *English* Ministers to accept them; which 'tis pretended they have done: and 'tis for this reason I make the Looseness and Ambiguity of these Articles an Argument of their being spurious. For Proposals that have a Sense so very indeterminate, are Proposals of nothing, and consequently in effect no Proposals at all; and therefore 'tis impossible, even the old M——y could think such Articles fit to be the Foundation of a Treaty of so much Importance. If indeed these Articles were propos'd on the part of *England*, as they are pretended to be on the part of *France*, I should not be at a loss to find an Author for them, or suspect their being genuine: but I must beg leave to say, we have a *Ministry* too well skill'd in the Arts of Language, and the Power of Words, to be so shamefully impos'd on by a much abler Man, than I take the Manager of these Articles to be.

These Prejudices which arose in my mind against these Preliminaries upon the first View of them, made me throw them aside, as not deserving any manner of regard; nor should I ever have taken them into my hands again, if the Enemies of the M——y did not make so much noise about them. They are the Subject that fills all places; one can go no where, but one finds  
some

some Paper or other writ against them; and the Party triumph in their Success against this Shadow of a Treaty. This made me live to look upon these Articles once again, which I never thought to do, and to consider them a little more particularly; and I can't but say, that the more I look upon them, the more I am confirm'd in my Opinion, that a Man must be very partial, and have thrown off all Esteem for the M——y, before he can believe them genuine. For first, what Reader is there can help observing the prodigious difference there is between these *new Preliminaries* and the *old ones*? And how can any Man, that sees the difference, think it possible for any *French* Minister to have impudence enough to offer such trifling stuff, or for any *English* one to agree to, or be at all satisfy'd with it? If any *new Preliminaries* are agreed on, we may be sure the Treaty about them was resum'd upon the foot of the *old ones*; and every body knows, the *French King* has over and over, and in the most solemn manner declar'd, he was ready to consent to all but the 37th; and the Conferences at *Gertruydenburgh* were held for nothing else but to find an Equivalent for that single Article: And consequently, whatever *new Preliminaries* are agreed to, they can differ from the *old ones*, only by such Alterations as the Change of that single Article can make necessary. In short, every thing but what affects the manner of evacuating *Spain*, should stand as it did. And since this is what *France* has never disputed from the time the first Articles were form'd, 'tis inconceivable that *France* should now ask us to give up Points she has hitherto consented to, or that an *English* M——y should give them up without asking.

Tis

'Tis therefore a Principle with me I can't depart from, that no Preliminaries can be the true ones, that don't intirely agree with the *old* ones, except in what relates to the Evacuation of the *Spanish Monarchy*; and for that reason I can never believe, those that go about the Town are genuine. For they are so far from agreeing with the old ones in all Points but one, that there is no one Point in which they are intirely alike; as every body's Memory will tell him, without being at the trouble to compare them. These *new* Articles are so far from being form'd upon the *old* ones, that they unhinge them all at once; and all the Steps that have been taken abroad towards a Peace, are as effectually undone as if they never had been made. In the old Articles the Allies knew what they might depend on; *Holland* and the *Empire*, not to mention the others, had their *Barriers* settled in full and clear Terms that could admit of no Dispute or Equivocation: but if we look for any thing like this in the new Articles, we shall look in vain. Instead of such and such strong Towns express'd by name with their Districts and Dependencies, they have now paum'd upon us a few indistinct words, that no Man living can make any sense of. The *Dutch* are told, they shall be put, instead of *Lisle*, *Tournay*, and twenty or thirty other places named in the old Preliminaries, into the possession of the fortify'd Places which *shall be* mention'd in the *Netherlands*, to serve hereafter for a *Barrier*. Have the *Dutch* at a vast Expende of Blood and Treasure actually got possession of a good Barrier, and must they now depend only upon such a Barrier, as *shall be* mention'd? Which words are so like nothing, that there is nothing like them; except what follows in the next Article, That a *secure and convenient Barrier* should be form'd for

the

the Empire and the House of *Austria*. To tell them they shall have *Brisac* and *Strasburgh*, and other places in *Alsace*, and that the *French Forts* upon the *Rhine* shall be demolish'd, is very intelligible: but to talk of a *secure and convenient Barrier*, is talking in the air, and saying nothing. I'm sure from such Articles no body can tell what the *French* will consent to; but it is plain they intend that *Holland* and the Empire shall always lie at their mercy, and be in danger of being over-run by a sudden Invasion, as soon as they shall have leisure or be in humour to extend their Conquests.

What *Flanders* and the Circles upon the *Upper Rhine* have suffer'd for these last forty years from *France*, is not to be express'd. No one, who has an image of the Barbarity of *French Ambition*, can think of it without horror. And if they have no better Barrier than they have had hitherto, they will be still expos'd to the same Calamities as before, after all they have suffer'd in this War to purchase some Security for the future. The *Four Associated Circles* especially will be so expos'd, upon whom all the Weight almost of the *German War* has fallen; and their Misery is such, that they have suffer'd almost as much from Friends as Enemies. Nay, without the Barrier for the Empire settled in the old Preliminaries, which is the least they can possibly be contented with, these poor Circles will be not only in as bad, but a worse state than before; which yet can hardly be. For by these Articles 'tis evident the Elector of *Bavaria* is to be restor'd, with his Brother of *Cologne*, to all they were before possess'd of: for they, no doubt, are included, or rather particularly meant, by those general words in the third Article, That the King's Intention is, that all the Parties engag'd

in



in the present War, without excepting any of them, may find their reasonable Satisfaction in the Treaty which shall be made. Do but look now into a Map, and see the miserable Situation of these poor Circles, hemm'd in between two *Frenchify'd Electors* and the *French Territories*. Look into some Maps of the *Palatinate*, all in flames, because they would not join with *France*, or agree to a *Neutrality*. 'Tis said that Barbarous Prince never wept but twice ; and once was upon a Representation of this unparallel'd Instance of his own Cruelty. Whoever considers the unhappy Situation of these *Circles*, and sees what they have already suffer'd, must want common Humanity, to deny them a good Barrier ; or common Sense, to think they can be safe without one. But that is not all ; 'tis not they only will be the Sufferers, by being expos'd to the Ambition of *France*, tho' that must very sensibly move a Man who has any Good-Nature, especially considering the Efforts they have made to sustain the Burden of the War, and the steady Courage with which they have withstood all the Sollicitations of *France* to come into a *Neutrality* : but that, I say, is not all ; the Mischief will reach a great deal further. If these miserable People are neglected in this Treaty, they will have no heart left ; they will in despair submit to any Terms *France* shall impose, without any Power of Resistance, or any Prospect of Relief. To submit to a *Neutrality*, will be the best they can do ; 'twill be an Act of Grace in the King of *France* to admit of their Submission upon such Terms. If he will give *Suabia* and *Franconia* to the Elector of *Bavaria*, to indemnify him for the great Losses he has sustain'd this War in his Service ; I don't see, how they can at all help themselves. But if he should not be so hard with them, should he

only oblige them to submit to a *Neutrality*, what do we think will be the Consequence of that? Won't the *French King* by that means be able without any opposition to carry his Arms into the Heart of the Empire? Will he not be able to invade the *Austrian Territories*, and drive the Emperor from his Throne, before any body is in condition to lift up a Hand against him? Let us but remember, how near this Danger came the second Year of this War, upon the Elector of *Bavaria's* going into the *French Interest*. The House of *Austria* were in one Campaign brought upon the brink of Ruin, and the Emperor was almost forc'd to retire from *Vienna*, upon the Treachery of one *Electo*r; and that tho the Confederacy was then form'd, and *France* had work enough for their Arms in other parts: and yet had not the Duke of *Marlborough* made the March to *Germany*, and won the Battel of *Blenheim*, the Emperor could not possibly have surviv'd, no not a few months, the Storm that then threaten'd him. The Elector of *Bavaria* had been long since in the Imperial Throne, and had govern'd *Germany* for the King of *France*, as his Grandson now does *Spain*: This had been then without a Turn that must not be again expected, and will certainly be one time or other, whenever *France* has a mind to it, the Consequence of leaving the Empire without a good Barrier. When the Confederacy is broke, and *France* is disengag'd from their other Enemies, 'tis but the work of a single Campaign; and the business may be done, before any new Alliance can be form'd or brought to act. This, from what has been, we may be sure will be; and then the long-labour'd Universal *Monarchy* is gain'd, beyond the Power not only of *England*, but of *Europe*, to dispute it.

What



What now can be more unjust in it self, more cruel to a brave but miserable People, more prejudicial to the House of *Austria*, more fatal to the *Empire*, or more surely destructive of the Liberty of *Europe*, than to leave the Empire without a tolerable Barrier? And yet if we are to judg by these Articles, 'tis evident that is the Design: For if a good Barrier be intended, why is it not nam'd? Why don't they in express words say so? Why don't they make the Minds of our *German* Allies as easy as they can, and tell them what they will do for them? Does any body say less kind things, when they are able to say more? Do we suffer our Friends to continue under an Alarm, when we can remove their Fears, by speaking plain? No body acts at this wild rate: If these Articles tell them they shall have a *secure and convenient Barrier*; *secure and convenient*, we may be sure, is all they have to tell them. This is in lieu of other good Securities: They are to have words instead of things; the words of a *French* Agent, which they know are never to be depended on, except when they threaten from the Immortal Man Ruin and Destruction.

Will any body now believe an *English* M——y is so devoted to the Interest of *France*, as to agree to Articles so repugnant to Honour, Justice, and Humanity, to all Truth and Good Faith, to the Safety of the *Empire*, and the Liberty of *Europe*? for these Points they are by the Grand Alliance oblig'd to take the greatest care of, and to make no Peace without securing them. And accordingly in the Negotiations on the other side the water, a just Concern was shewn for them, and a good Barrier provided. And 'tis astonishing to see any thing call'd a *Preliminary* Treaty start up now, in which so essen-

tial a Part of a good Peace is left out, and nothing but two or three loose words substituted in the room of it. Can this be the work of an *English M—y*, of the *New M—y*, the best and wisest this Nation was ever blest'd with? Others may believe this if they will, I never shall without having the worst Opinion of them.

But perhaps the Distance of the Empire, the Remoteness of the Danger, what we hear of the low Condition *France* is in, and the Inability of drawing Consequences, may make some People suspect much less mischief in this Article than there really is. Let them therefore try their Thoughts upon a Subject nearer home, and see if they can think there is any Justice, or Honour, or Safety in the preceding Article which relates to the *Dutch Barrier*; which, instead of what has been agreed to by all Parties, and by *England* in particular, is now, we are told, to consist of such places as shall be mention'd. What can be more Plainly telling the *Dutch*, that they shall not have what has been mention'd? Nothing is so certain as that what shall be mention'd, will be different from what has been mention'd; tho no body who is not in the Secret, can tell how great that Difference may be: But that it will be to the disadvantage of the *Dutch*, our Good and Great, and most Faithful Allies, and for the Service of the Common Enemy, an Enemy whom nothing can satisfy but the Ruin of us both; this there can't be the least doubt of from these Preliminaries. The old Frontier of the *Netherlands* is so very insufficient, that a Man must be a stranger to all that has past in *Europe* for these fifty years, to think it can be depended on; and yet even that is more than the *French King* can at present engage they shall have, since he has given *Namur* and *Charleroy*, with *Luxemburgh* and

and the whole *Netherlands*, in Sovereignty to the Elector of *Bavaria*, and by that means put it as much out of his Power to give the Allies the Towns in *Flanders* yet unconquer'd.

But if this Difficulty could be overcome, which it can't be any other way than by the *Restoration* of the Elector, which there was reason to hope the Allies would never consent to, but upon some valuable Considerations in Favour of the poor Duke of *Lorain*, whose Protection is of the greatest Consequence to the Interest of the Common Cause! Suppose, I say, this Difficulty were overcome, and *France* could give the same Barrier for the *Netherlands* they had before, 'tis no manner of Security to them, that they shall not to be over-run, whenever *France* shall have a mind to it: And that we may be sure they can never want, if we consider, that the Acquisition of *Flanders* is one great Point, which has been always at the bottom of the *French* King's Designs, and which is a View nothing has ever made him lose sight of. 'Twould make a History to repeat all that *France* has endeavour'd to compass this Design, ever since the Treaty of *Munster*; and nothing can effectually defeat this Design, but giving the *Dutch* a good Barrier, which the *French* have submitted to in the Old Preliminaries. But if we may credit the new ones, they have found the way to get off of that Engagement; and what Additions they will please to make to the old Barrier, we are left to guess from very general words, from which nothing can be concluded, but that they shall not have what they were to have had before. This is very unjust in it self, being directly contrary to the fundamental Articles of the Grand Alliance; by which it appears, that a good Barrier for the *Netherlands* was one of the capital Points,

Points, for the sake of which both they and we went into the War. And what makes this Article not only unjust but absurd, is, that a good Barrier does not at all depend upon the pleasure of the *French*; 'tis already purchas'd, and that at a vast Expence of Blood and Treasure; and they are actually in possession of what they would have, or at least of the most essential Parts; and these must be given up to *France*, if these Articles are to take place: for were it intended they should keep what they have got, no doubt it would have been express'd. What now can be more extravagant, than to go into a most expensive War to get a good Barrier, to succeed in this War, and acquire by the Sword the Barrier you want; and then, for no body knows what reason, to give up what you have been so long fighting for? Shall the *Dutch* be turn'd out of the Acquisitions, that are the Price of their Blood and Treasure? And shall a Son of *France* keep possession of a vast Monarchy, that cost him nothing, and which he has no better Title to than what the vilest Treachery and Perjury can give? Can Articles be genuine that speak these things? 'Tis impossible! If Faith and Justice did not in the strictest manner oblige us to insist on a good Barrier for the *Dutch*, the brave and honourable Part they have acted in this War, and the great Regard they have had to the Interest of *England*, highly deserves it of us; 'tis the least that in gratitude we can do for them. For a Man that is at all acquainted with the nature of their Government, and how intirely they subsist by Commerce, needs not be told, that in their Inclinations they can never be averse to Peace, 'tis their Interest to keep out of War as much as possible; and when the necessity of Affairs has brought them into it, they are always studying to put an  
end



end to it as soon as they can. This is evidently their Interest, and the Spirit of their Government : This has constantly been their practice in all former Wars ; and their great Propensity to Peace has made them, on several occasions, in too much haste for it, which *France* has made Advantage of : and there is nothing we have had more reason to fear, than that the Length and Expence of this War would tire out their Patience, and hinder them from pursuing it with Vigour, till the Ends of the Grand Alliance could be obtain'd.

But all our Fears of this kind have prov'd groundless, to the great Surprize of their Friends as well as of the common Enemy : They have out-done themselves, and all that was expected from them ; they have shewn such a Firmness, as they never did before since they were a State, and probably never will again, if these are to be the Fruits of it. They have acted with a Spirit above all private Views, and rejected with Disdain all Temptations to come into separate Measures. There is nothing *France* would not have given them many years since to break with their Allies ; they might have had any Barrier, and Commerce settled upon what Terms they would : and no body ever thought them very much concern'd for the Restitution of *Spain* and the *Indies*.

All this is notoriously known, and a Man must be an utter stranger to Affairs to make the least question of this : And yet what a noble Part have they acted ? Who could have expected so steady, so generous, so disinterested a Conduct, such a punctual and exact Adherence to their Allies as they have shewn ? They have been deaf to the most specious Offers, have declin'd all separate Measures, and every thing that could give  
the

the least Umbrage to their Friends ; they have taken no Steps but in concert with them, all has been above-board with the most perfect Honour and Integrity. They wisely judg'd there was no lasting Safety but in good Alliances ; and that nothing can effectually secure them the Assistance of new ones, when they shall be wanted, but a faithful and just Adherence to the old ones. They judg'd that no Terms *France* could give, can be so truly for their Interest, as to cultivate a perfect good Understanding with *England*. For the sake of this they have refus'd all Offers of Peace, in which *England* could not find their particular Advantage ; resolv'd, it seems, to stand and fall together.

This is the noble Firmness they have shewn, this the great and tender Regard they have had to the Interest of *England*. Behold now their Reward ! These brave and faithful Allies are to be sacrific'd, to no body knows what Interest ; their Adherence to us, and Rejection of all private Offers, is made Matter of Reproach. They who might have had any thing they would ask, if they would have been false, are to have nothing, because they are true : we desert them, because they would not desert us ; and the Recompence they are to have for preferring the common Good to any private Views, I may say the Good of *England* to any separate Good of their own, is to be given up to *France*. We in effect tell them, they have lost their Opportunity, that they should have taken care of themselves in time, and that they must now be content with what *France* will give, and that we may be sure will be little enough ; for, besides all other Reasons, they don't scruple to tell us, that *France* is offended with their Treatment of their Ministers, that is in truth, with their firm Adherence



Adherence to their Allies: and the worse they stand with *France*, the better Quarter this in all reason should procure them with their Friends. But if they have no Security except in these Preliminaries, they have little to hope for from them: for what they promise in these Articles is very little; and as little as People promise, the Performance generally is still less. So that they have Reason to fear they shall be upon much the same foot they have been hitherto; and that will expose them to perpetual Wars, and perpetual Wars must needs end in the Ruin of their State. What now can be more dishonourable for *England*, than to use in this ungrateful manner such good Allies, who have been so faithful to us, and who deserve the greatest Regard that can possibly be shewn to them? Have we no Sense of Gratitude and Honour? Let us at least have some regard to our own Safety; for safe we can't be while we leave them in danger: our Fate, in spite of all that can be said, is inevitably involv'd in theirs; they are our Fence and Barrier, and whenever they are over-run, or made a Province to *France*, Unhappy *England*, from that Moment take leave of thy Religion, Liberty and Commerce; thy Ruin is as infallible as if it were now at thy Doors: For if *England* with *Holland* is not a Match for *France*, what is it we can do without them? But this is not all, our Interest is particularly affected by what affects their Barrier; for by the same Treaty that we engage to maintain their Barrier, they reciprocally engage to maintain our Succession; a Point every *Englishman* must be heartily concern'd for, and which no body can think can be too well secur'd, who considers the evil Spirit that discovers it self in the North part of *Great-Britain*, and which lurks about so much in o-

ther parts, as to give just Apprehensions to all who have the Protestant Succession at Heart, and are thorowly concern'd for the great Points that depend upon it. But if this Treaty be destroy'd, a great Security will be remov'd, and that will encourage the Pretender's Friends to take heart, and think they shall now have a good Game of it, when they are to act against a People divested of all useful Alliances, and divided amongst themselves. Thus, whether we consider the natural Consequence of distressing the *Dutch*, by forcing them to submit to a weak Barrier, or the particular Treaty by which we have engag'd our selves to maintain them in the Possession of a good one, our Safety is too closely interwoven with theirs, to be separated from it, and one Fate will in the Event be the Fate of both.

But if breaking in upon the *Dutch* Barrier be so very contrary to Justice, and Honour, and our own Interest ; a Man must allow the Articles that do it cannot be genuin, or he must have strange Notions of the new M ———y, and think worse of them than their greatest Enemies have ever pretended to do yet.

But there is still something more scandalous in these Articles with relation to the *Dutch*, and which consequently makes it still more incredible that they can be true Articles ; and that is, the Preliminary about the Demolishing of *Dunkirk*, which I take to be the grossest Fiction that ever was invented, and must open the Eyes of all that are not obstinately blind ; for 'tis so bare-fac'd, as to admit of no Colour or Disguise. *Dunkirk* shall be demolish'd, upon condition that a proper Equivalent, that may content the *French* King be given him. A Man that has heard any thing of the old Preliminaries, must be strangely surpriz'd to see such a

Condition annex to this Article, which till now the *French* King has never pretended to ask, since that Article was first agreed. What a Mystery is this, that Things which were before unexceptionably agreed to, must now either not be done, or done upon condition of giving an Equivalent, and that Equivalent such as shall content him? and who can tell what that will be? A Man that engages to do a thing upon no other Terms but such as shall be to his Satisfaction, will either not do it, or be well paid for it, and will take that part of the Alternative he has most mind to. But to make this Article more a Jest, and insult the *Dutch* in the openest manner possible, we are told, that *England* can't give the Equivalent, and therefore — therefore what? why, it shou'd be; and therefore *Holland* shall. But instead of saying so in direct Words, which is most certainly their Meaning, they choose to express themselves thus, that the Discussion of it shall be referr'd to the Conferences to be held for the Peace. Now what is the natural Sense of these Words? We will in the Conferences discuss this Point, what Equivalent shall be given to *France* for *Dunkirk*. Well this Equivalent will be found, or 'twill not: if not, then *Dunkirk* is not to be demolish'd; if it be found, it must be found with the *Dutch*: for the Article declares *England* can't give it. Is not this now a pretty Story? Must not *Holland* like mightily to be told, that they shall be oblig'd to give up a good part of the Barrier, *Lille* and *Tournay* suppose, Places upon which their Security so much depends, to purchase a Security for the *English* Trade? Do we deserve so well of them, as to expect they should easily consent to this? or can we have the Face to ask it of them, when the great

Regard they have had for us is so ill rewarded? And if they could be Fools enough to consent to a reasonable Equivalent for *Dunkirk*, are the *French* Fools enough to think that reasonable which we shall be apt to think is? I can't but fear these two very ill Consequences of this Article: *first*, That the *French* will have Interest enough to put off the *Dutch* with a less Barrier than they ought to have, under a Pretence of demolishing *Dunkirk*; and when that Point is gain'd, that one Stone of it will never be thrown down. If we consider either the Importance of the Place, or the constant Practice of the *French* in the Execution of all their Treaties for half an Age, we must own these are very probable Suspicions, tho not certain ones. So shall we disoblige the *Dutch* to the last degree, in complement to *France*, and gain nothing by it our selves. This is all we are like to get by confounding the *Dutch* Barrier, which is the manifest Intention of these Articles; in which there is so much Folly as well as Injustice and Ingratitude, that I should think no M——y that could be pick'd in all *England*, except profest Jacobites, could ever be capable of giving their Consent to them. I must therefore desire to be excus'd, if I cannot believe such things of those, who have at present the Administration of Affairs.

Thus ill, according to these Articles, 'tis like to fare with *Holland* and the Empire. And the Jest goes round; for if we look well into them, we shall find as little Provision made for ourselves: for what is it we are promis'd in the first Article, but that he will acknowledg the Queen, and also the Succession according to the present Settlement, without a Word of the Protestant Line, or of our Acts of Parliament? A mighty Favour indeed, for which we are much oblig'd

oblig'd to him! But won't he acknowledge the Pretender also in the same Quality? Won't he support his Pretensions when 'tis for his Service? Will he send him out of his Dominions, and take away all occasion of Jealousy on that side? This was promised very fully in the old Preliminaries, but in the new ones there is not a Word it! And what can be the Meaning of this? Did not the *English* M——rs desire it? or did Mr. *Mefnager* refuse it? Can we suppose the first guilty of so great a Neglect, or that 'tis omitted for any other reason, but because 'tis not intended to be comply'd with? And if that be the Truth of the matter, what a fine case will these Articles put us into? If the Pretender's Return be the Point in view no wonder the Barrier Treaty is confounded, by which, as I have already observed, the *Dutch* are engaged to assist us in maintaining the Protestant Succession.

Next to the Succession, the other great Point *England* is concern'd for, is their Trade: Let us see now what Care these Articles take of that; why truly, *The King's Intention is, that Commerce may be re-establish'd and maintain'd for the future, to the advantage of Great Britain, of Holland, and of the other Nations who have been accus'd to exercise Commerce.* A very gracious Intention, this! We are told Commerce shall be re-establish'd and maintain'd; these Words say nothing else, but that Commerce shall, at the end of the War, be put upon the same foot it was upon before the War began: and what could we expect less, if the War had been as much against us as it has been for us? All the Trade he could hinder us of, is the Trade with his own Kingdom, or with *Spain*, the first we had little of before the War began, and



we shall have less of the second, if we have nothing but his Word to depend upon. We are sure he has been long studying to turn the Stream of the *Spanish* Trade another way; and as long as his Grandson is in Possession of the *Spanish* Monarchy, we can't hope it should be otherwise.

But the latter part of this Article deserves our particular Attention, and shews us plainly what we are to expect: To *Great Britain* and *Holland* is added *other Nations* who have been accustom'd to exercise Commerce. What Nations does any body think are here meant? Can they be any other than *France* and *Spain*? What then can be the meaning of these words, but that the *French* will exercise Commerce where, and with whom, and upon what Terms they please? And there is our *Spanish* and *West-India* Trade lost in a few words. Is this the Language of the old Preliminaries? No, far from it; there 'tis expressly caution'd that *France* shall not trade to the *Spanish West-Indies* upon any pretence whatever, nor have any Settlements in any part of those Dominions. 'This was a great and real Security to our Trade, but in the new Articles 'tis all taken away, and we must take what *France* will please to give us, and hold it at their pleasure. This is all we can expect from these Articles in a point upon which the Strength and Riches of the Nation so much depend.

But do not these things shock us? Don't we begin to suspect the Genuineness of Articles that are so very scandalous if the Danger of *Holland* and the Empire won't affect us, have we no concern for poor *England*? If we are insensible of the Calamities which an ill Peace will expose our Allies to, are we void of all regard to our own Safety? Don't these Evils touch us, when they come to us, and our own Trade and Liberty,



erty, with every thing else that is dear to us, is at stake? If we have any sense of these things, we must see they are the necessary Consequences of these Articles, and so obvious that a wise M——y can't but see them all; and therefore no Man who has the least Esteem for the present M——y, can suppose they have agreed to them.

In short, whoever considers these Articles impartially, must own that nothing can be more contrary to the former Preliminaries, the chief Articles of the Grand Alliance, the Assurances which the Friends of the new M——y have all along given us, or to the only authentick Account we have of what has past in the late Negotiations: The *New Journey to Paris*, is the Piece I mean; for every thing we know of these Transactions, but what we have in that admirable History, is convey'd to the World thro the hands of *Abel*, the most profligate Writer even of this Age, and therefore nothing we find in his Papers can be depended on; for 'tis impossible any M——y would chuse to convey things to the People by so infamous a Hand, which is enough to bring a discredit upon any thing that passes thro it. Now in the *Journey to Paris*, which is a masterly Performance, we are made to hope for other sort of things than we find in these Articles: there Monsieur *Matthews* is overheard to say with Resolution—*TOUT OU RIEN*; *All, Sir, or Nothing*. But if we give credit to these Articles, this Resolution soon gave way, and a short Decision is made: The King has given us of his great Goodness all the latter part of the Alternative, and we have without difficulty accepted it: that is, the King has taken the *All*, and left us just nothing; which is directly contrary to all the Assurances the

Friends

Friends of the New M——y have all along given us. For to make us easy in the Change, which many of us did not like at first, because 'twas new, they told us in all their Phamphlets that the new M——y would take care to procure better Terms for all the Allies in general than the old ones had done, and particularly that more regard would be had to the trading Interest of *England*. But how shall those Assurances be reconcil'd with these Articles? Either these Writers, if they were sincere, did not know what they said, or the M——rs are strangely alter'd since, or these Articles must be false: but there is no room to suppose the first. 'Tis plain those Writers were too well acquainted with the M——rs to mistake their Sense; and I have never heard, nor I believe any body else that the M——y had in so short a time chang'd their Scheme, nor has any ill Turn of Affairs abroad forc'd them to it: and therefore I conclude, they intend as good a Peace for us as ever, and consequently that these Articles are scandalous and false which are no less contrary to the fundamental Articles of the Grand Alliance, than to the Assurances last mention'd. But this and their Inconsistency with the old Preliminaries is so well and plainly shewn in a little Pamphlet, call'd, *Remarks on the Preliminary Articles*, that I shall not spend any time in repeating what is said there: I shall rather observe, as a further Prejudice against the Authority of these Preliminaries a strange Omission in them.

The great difficulty in the old Preliminaries, was the finding an Expedient for the 37th Article; the Evacuation of the *Spanish Monarchy* being the great Point for which we went into the War, and upon which the Safety of us and our Allies most depends; to say nothing of the Right  
of

of the House of *Austria*, which we are engag'd to support them in. This being the Point upon which the former Conferences broke off; not whether *Spain* and the *Indies* should be evacuated or not, for that *France* did not dispute, but how the Performance of that Article might be most effectually secur'd; one would have expected to have found some Solution of this great Difficulty in the new Preliminaries: but instead of any Expedient for so important a Point, or any Security for the Performance of it, 'tis quite dropt; and did we remember nothing of the former Negotiations, we should from these Articles conclude, this had not been mention'd in them; nor in the least have suspected that the Evacuation of the *Spanish* Monarchy was any part of the Dispute. For all that these Articles say, is, that *France* will consent to the taking of all just and reasonable Measures, that the two Crowns may never be united on the Head of the same Prince. *Just and reasonable* are safe words: and from what the *French* have said to maintain the Nullity of the *Renunciation* their King himself made of the *Spanish* Crown, we may be sure, if the Dauphin, or the Duke of *Anjou*, should die without Children, that in that Case no Measures to hinder the Union of the Crowns would be thought just and reasonable: for if any thing of that kind can be just and reasonable, the *Renunciation* was so; and if the *Renunciation* was not just, the Wit of Man can invent nothing which we can be sure *France* will think so, or rather which we are not sure *France* will not think so. 'Tis not in the power of Treaties, Laws or Oaths, to tie up those whom the Solemnities of that *Renunciation* could not bind. And therefore to talk of taking just and reasonable Measures, is saying nothing at all; tho if that Point could be secur'd, what are

we the better for it? While a Son of *France* is on the *Spanish* Throne, the *Spaniards* will be but Pensioners to them: They will not only insensibly ingross the Woollen-Trade, but the *Indies* will flow in to them. The Duke of *Anjou* will by Inclination be led to promote their Interest; and if he were otherwise inclin'd, he is in so helpless a Condition, that he must be forc'd to it whether he will or no. *France* will always have that hold upon him, that he will be able to refuse them nothing: besides, there is all the reason in the world to think, he is under the strictest Obligations and Engagements to *France*, for the great Expence they have been at to support him on his Throne. Can any body think this is all pure Honour in *France*? or that a Day of Payment won't come? No, let us depend upon it, he has engag'd to *France* the most advantageous Branches of Trade, and perhaps some of their best worts in *Spain* and the *Indies*. This will be conceal'd or deny'd at present, because 'tis convenient to do so; but when a weace is made, and he is settled in his Government, then both the *Spaniards* and we shall see, when all Remedies are too late, what a Dependance they are under to *France*, and what a dear Bargain they have of a *French* Prince. So that in the Event 'twill be all one whether the two Crowns be united on the same Head or not, as long as they are both in the same Family. And the Consequence with respect to our Trade will be much the same in either case: it will be the certain Ruin of this Nation. But 'tis possible *France* may not be dispos'd to stay so long; they may not have patience to wait the issue of slow Measures, when they have quicker in their hands. When *Spain* is by a Peace settled on a *French* Head, the *French* after a few years respite will be at leisure to



to resume their Designs upon the *Netherlands*; and for want of a good Barrier, the *Dutch* will be able to make but a poor Resistance: and if either the Fears of an ill War, or the Misfortunes of it, force them into *French* Measures, what have we to trust to but to follow their Example? And what can a tame Submission to *France* end in, but the utter Ruin of our Religion, Trade and Government? These must be the unavoidable Consequences, without some strange Interposition of Providence, of our suffering *Spain* and the *Indies* to continue in *French* hands. And is this the Peace we have been fighting for? Are these the Fruits of a successful War? this the Purchase of Fifty Millions, and of above a Hundred Thousand of our own Men? Can any *Englishman* be easy in this fatal Prospect? Can we think an *English* M——y can be guilty of intailing so much Misery on us and our Posterity? Shall we not rather think these Articles an Imposture only, contriv'd to blacken them, than believe them true, or that the present M——rs are capable of giving into them?

Besides these Arguments against the Genuineness of these Articles taken from the Articles themselves, I can't but take notice, in Vindication of the M——y, of two other great Prejudices that lie against them: The first is, that they have never appear'd in any Paper publish'd by Authority; and the other is, that there has never been publish'd any tolerable Defence of them. Tho perhaps the M——y might not think it proper to publish them, before they were communicated to the Allies; yet since they are come abroad, and are in every body's hand, 'tis probable, when they were no longer a Secret, the M——rs would, if they had been genuine, have given us an authenick Copy of them: which since

D 2

they

they have not done, this must be allow'd to be a great Presumption that they are spurious.

But I insist more on the other Prejudice that lies against them, I mean the poor weak Defences that have been made of them: For some of the Friends of the M——y have been as blind as their Enemies, and have been as zealous in defending the Preliminaries, as the others have been in attacking them, without e'er inquiring whether they are genuine or not. But what are these Defences, but pitiful Declamations upon the Miseries of War? upon which there is not a School-boy that can't declame better from any Common-place-Book, than all that these Writers have advanc'd. They never state the Question, or enter into the Merits of the Cause; there is not the Shadow of an Argument in all they say; they lay down no Rules to judg by, don't consider the Design of the War, or what we propos'd by entering into it, or the Obligations we are under to our Allies, or what is essential to a good Peace, or the Importance 'tis of to the lasting Welfare of the Nation. But these are things that must be inquired into and stated, before they can say a Word to the purpose. In short, all they say amounts to this, That War is a sad thing, and brings a World of Evils with it; But Peace, O dear Peace! how sweet art thou! They are so silly as to think Peace admits of no Epithets, as somebody says ingeniously of Slavery; that there is no such thing as a bad Peace: you would think by their Writings, that that Expression implies a Contradiction. Let Peace be Peace, and without more ado 'tis with them a good Peace. They quite mistake the state of the Question, which is not whether we shall prefer Peace or War, but whether we shall continue the War we are in a little



tle longer, to secure a good Peace; or by running hastily into an insecure one, expose our selves to the Danger of a new War four or five Years hence. This is the Question to be consider'd: War is not set against Peace; but the present War, which is in a condition of being carry'd on with the greatest Prospect of Success, against a future War, when the Enemy will have recover'd the Misfortunes of this, and we shall neither be able to encounter him ourselves, nor find any sure Support in our Allies; which is not to be expected, if this War ends no better than 'tis like to do by these Articles. Sometimes indeed they endeavour to make us believe that the Peace is necessary; but how do they prove this? Perhaps 'tis necessary; but for whom? For *Peter* or *John*? But that is not the Question: Is it necessary for the Nation? Can they prove that? Can they shew upon a Comparison, that we suffer more by the War than the Enemy, or are less able to carry it on? 'Tis not Declamations on the Misery of the People will prove the Point, it must be done by comparing our Condition with that of the Enemies; which is a Comparison not for their turn, they know, and therefore they don't meddle with it. All therefore they say proves nothing, but that War is an evil thing; and if there is any Force in their Arguments, we ought upon no Consideration to enter into it. For if any thing be a reason for entering into a War, there may be the same reason for continuing in it, till we have obtain'd what we Want, or the Enemy by their superior Strength force us to a Peace; which God be thank'd is not our Case. If we make a scandalous Peace (for a Peace may be scandalous) we have nobody else to blame, we force our selves into it. And till the Defenders of  
these

these Articles can shew the contrary, all they say is to no purpose. But besides the Weakness of their Arguments, the whole manner of their Writings is such, as shews they are Writers of a very low Form; which is a great Sign these Articles are not genuin: For if they were, we may be assur'd the ablest Pens would have appear'd in Defence of them; we should have had something from the ingenious Writer of the *Tale of the Tub*, or the excellent Author of the *Ladle*, Subjects pretty much of a siz with these noble Articles. These Writers would have given us some Wit from themselves, tho' there be no Reason in their Cause; and Colours at least would have been found, that with many might have passed for Arguments. The Persons concern'd would never have left a Matter of so much Importance, to be defended by such dull Writers as *Abel*, or *Sir Th. Spunge*, and some others I could name, who are not able to do Justice to a good one, much less to disguise artfully a bad one, so very bad a one as this, which wants all the Help that Invention and Art can give. Most of those who have hitherto appear'd in the Defence of it, plainly shew they know nothing of the matter, nor are able to judg whether they should defend the thing or not; but out of Zeal, or to make their Court, write at all Adventures, without consulting their Principals, or receiving their Instructions.

One of them indeed, I mean the Author of an insolent and furious Libel against the Duke of *Marlborough*, called his Vindication, could pretend to be of a higher Form, and assumes the Air of a First Minister; there are many Marks of this in his Invective, but particularly towards the end he says, *We can't explain to our People*

This

This is an Expression that does not very well become an Author in a lower Sphere, and he must think very greatly of himself before such an Expression could drop from him. I shall not pretend to guess at the Author, tho his ridiculous and unfair Quotation out of Sir *William Temple* might lead one to think of a certain Writer, whose Religion is said to be equal to his Skill in Politicks. But to let that pass at the end of this Pamphlet, the Author sets forth with all his Eloquence the Misery of the People, and infers from thence the Necessity of a Peace, and more than insinuates, that perhaps they might make a separate one; which puts me in mind of a Saying I have heard of somebody's, That we might have a better Peace than ever was offer'd yet, if her Majesty did not too scrupulously adhere to her Alliances: which is a great Commendation of her Majesty, but I think not much for the Honour of any body else. But whatever Peace the Ministers think fit to make, this Author thinks the People may be fully satisfy'd, 'twas the best they could obtain. I have I confess a very great respect for the present M——y, but can't go the Lengths this Writer would have me; I can't implicately confide in what they do: We have been too long us'd to Liberty, and have paid too dear for it, to part with it so easily: We have been taught to reason upon the publick Transactions, and the Conduct of our M——rs; and this, I believe, this Writer will own was very right during the late M——y; and for that reason I can't but think it so still: And he must take away our Understandings, or else we shall be apt to make use of them, and speak too what we think, whether we like it or not. And indeed it seems to be no great Compliment to the M——y, to desire a blind Submission to them;

for

for the righter their Conduct is, the more 'tis for their Honour to have it look'd into ; and it looks as if things would not bear the Light, when those who are their Friends desire we would shut our Eyes.

But there is one Point indeed relating to a Peace, upon which the Writers of this Side advance something that has the colour of an Argument ; and that is- that the Face of Affairs is chang'd by the Death of the Emperor, and therefore we ought not to wonder that the M——y depart from the old Preliminaries, as to the entire Restitution of the *Spanish* Monarchy ; since they would have it thought to be equally dangerous to *Europe*, to have *Spain* and the Empire in one hand, as the Union of *Spain* and *France* would be. But as specious as this may seem to such as know nothing of the Affairs of *Europe* ; to all who are the least acquainted with them, this Talk must needs appear to be a mere Banter. And the Death of the Emperor is only made use for a Cover to the Partition they design'd before he died : for if we look back to what the *Examiner* and his Friends told us a year ago, we shall see their Schemes of Peace never suppos'd the Evacuation of *Spain* ; but, on the contrary, they pretended 'twas unreasonable to insist upon it, and that addressing the Queen, as both Houses of Parliament did, not to make any Peace without the Restitution of *Spain*, was done with no other View than to perpetuate the War ; and therefore *Spain* and the *Indies* shall in a future Peace be given up to *France*. 'Tis not because the Emperor is dead, 'tis because they resolv'd to do it, whether the Emperor had dy'd or not ; 'twas resolv'd, when his Death was no more thought on, than the Death of any Man that is now alive. All their Pretences therefore  
for



for leaving *France* in possession of *Spain* and the *Indies*, are insincere and false. But in this very Pretence of theirs, all honest Men will see a Vindication of the old M——y, to whom Justice must not be deny'd any more than to the new, if, as they say, the Emperor's Death has alter'd the Case, and made it not necessary for us to insist any longer on the intire Restitution of the *Spanish* Monarchy. This is a Confession that, before this Case happen'd, 'twas right and necessary it should be insisted on, and consequently the old M——y did but their Duty to contribute what they could towards it. Indeed nothing could be more just or necessary, if we have any regard to our Treaties, to the End for which we went into the War, to the Interest of our Allies, and to our own Safety; and this has been the united Sense of Queen and People of the whole Nation, of all our Allies: and we must have a very unaccountable deference to the *Examiner* and his friends, to think that all of a sudden to be very wrong, which all the World have for so many years thought to be right, and so necessary that no Peace could be safe without it. These Writers had a wretched Cause to maintain while the Emperor liv'd, and that makes them lay hold of his Death, as if that would justify their new Schemes. But upon a very little Examination this Cover will appear to be a very thin one; for what can be more trifling than to tell us at this time of day, that the House of *Austria* would be too formidable, and the Liberty of *Europe* be in danger, if the whole Monarchy of *Spain* were to be given to the new Emperor?

I could be glad the Fears of these Gentlemen were not quite so groundless as they are, for then we might hope our Allies would be a Match for *France*, without our engaging in their Quarrels;  
E
and



and that is the greatest Happiness for this Nation that any true *Englishman* can hope for : for if the Allies were a tolerable Ballance against *France* without us, then it would always be in our power to turn the Scales, and we should be Arbitrators of *Europe* in earnest. And if the House of *Austria* could really be as formidable, as the Patrons of an ill Peace would have it thought, even then the Danger to us would by no means be equal to what we may suffer from the exorbitant Power of *France*. The Greatness of the House of *Austria* might be troublesome to their Neighbours on the Continent, but what have we to apprehend from them ? Can they, be they as great as they will, affect us in our very Vitals, and ruin our Commerce, as *France* may do ? Can we suppose the House of *Austria* could have a superior Fleet drop out of the Clouds ? Or can they disturb our Trade without a Fleet ? What then is it we pretend to be afraid of ? But, alas ! the very Supposition of their Greatness is all a jest. Let us but look back into the last War : Had not the Emperor all the *Spanish* Monarchy of his Side, and yet what did it signify, what a Figure did they make in *Spain* and upon the *Rhine* ? What did the House of *Austria* with all their Allies, and *England* it self, perform ? Was not *France* abundantly too hard for all ? How much worse then must the Issue of that War have been, had *England* not engag'd in it ? Is now the Riches or Power of the Emperor increas'd since that War, or could *Spain* give him more Assistance now than it did then ? Has not the House of *Austria* been exhausted by continual Wars for these thirty years past ? Are not the Hereditary Countries drain'd almost to the last Drop ? And is it not the same with *Spain* ? Was it not in a miserable languid Condition before  
this

this War began? And is it possible to describe how much it has suffer'd since? What then is it we pretend to fear? Is there any thing but a shadow of Power left? Has not the Weakness of the House of *Austria* been sufficiently discover'd by the weak Efforts they have made this War, by the Insults they have born from a little Prince, for so the King of *Sweden* is in comparison of what an Emperor should be; and by their Inability to compel the Princes of the Empire to do their Parts in the Prosecution of the War? Can we turn our Thoughts to any one side, on which we would take a View of the Strength of the House of *Austria*, and not presently discover it to be all Weakness? But if this be the present State of it, can any body tell when 'tis like to be otherwise? Have they the same means to recover themselves, as *France* and other trading Nations have? Have they any Prospect of having influence enough on the Members of the Empire, to make them unite with Vigour against *France*? Are they not surrounded with Neighbours, from whom they have always reason to apprehend Danger? And won't that even in time of Peace oblige them to so great an Expence, as will not suffer them to recover their present Weakness, but by very slow degrees? And after all, is there more than one Branch left, and is not that a very great weakening of the *Austrian* Interest? What then can be more ridiculous than to fear the new Emperor should grow too great? We may be very sure, if his Neighbours won't disturb him, he won't disturb them; 'tis his Interest to be quiet, and *Europe* may promise it self a lasting Peace, if it be not broke till he be the Breaker of it: For nothing can be weaker than his Power in the Empire is at present; and the addition of the *Spanish*

nish Monarchy will be a Burden to him rather than any Advantage for many years, tho a Burden he would be glad to bear, rather than it should fall into the hands of *France*, to whom *Spain* and the *Indies* would be infinitely more useful than they can ever be to him. If therefore he were possesst of the whole Monarchy, he would be himself the least Gainer by it; it would be taking a great Strength from *France*, but he would add very little by it to himself: and therefore in truth his Allies, *England* particularly, is more immediately concern'd for the Restitution of *Spain* and the *Indies* than the Emperor can be, tho even our Interest is in some measure his. For the stronger and richer we are, the more able we shall be to support him against *France*; which Support he can't stand without, and it will be well if he can with it, which there will be little hopes of, if this War end in an ill Peace.

But at present the best Prospect we have, is, that if we unite together, we may be able to stand our Ground. And is not this a sad State of things, that all the Powers of *Europe* shall be over-run by one, if *England* don't take part with them? Is it not our Interest to make the utmost Effort, to put things on a better foot, that we may not be necessitated to go into a War, which is so extremely inconvenient for a People whose Riches depend so much on their Trade, and who can't but at a vast Expence make War upon the Continent, whenever *France* pleases to invade any of its Neighbours? But this is an Evil there is no possibility of avoiding, if *France* continues in the possession of *Spain*, or the Power of the House of *Austria* is so low. Instead therefore of imaginary Fears from the too great Power of the Emperor, the true Concern we

we ought to have, is, that all we can do can't make him powerful enough to preserve the Peace of *Europe*, and Ballance *France* without our Help.

'Tis plain now, that as the Death of the Emperor is not the true reason for not insisting on the Evacuation of *Spain*, so neither is it a good one; and the Use we ought to make of the turn his Death has given to Affairs, is just the Reverse of that which these miserable Politicians would make of it. It ought to give us fresh Hopes of carrying our Point, and make us insist on the Restitution of *Spain* more than ever; since by the Imperial Crown's being settled on K. *Charles* his Head, we have a fairer Prospect of succeeding, than we could have while his Brother liv'd; for now the interest of the Emperor and King of *Spain* is but one Interest, the same Person being both. And as a new Emperor is more concern'd to maintain himself in the *Spanish* Monarchy, and knows better the Condition of it, and how to take the properest Measures for it, so has it a great deal more in his power than he had before; and therefore we may reasonably expect he will make much greater Efforts, than either he or his Brother did before, to secure a Point of so much Concern to him. And is this a time to give up the Dispute? Shall we now desert his Cause after having stood by him so long? Have we spent so much Treasure and Blood to keep his Cause alive, while he was able to do but very little for himself? And shall we now leave him, when by his Succession to the Imperial Crown, he has so much a better Prospect of recovering *Spain*, if we continue our Assistance, and consequently of making us some Amends for our Adherence to him? Sure these are strange Politicks, to quit our Point when 'tis most likely to succeed, and sit down with the Loss



Loss of all we have been contending for, when the Reward of our Expence and Pains is in view.

'Tis very strange to make that turn of Affairs a Reason for giving up the Cause, which is the greatest Reason that can be for pursuing it. But this is the wise Part these Writers take, who think the Death of the Emperor a very good Reason, or rather Excuse, for doing what they were resolv'd to do before, whether it were to be justify'd or not: And as if they had clearly decided this important Question, and the entire Restitution of the *Spanish* Monarchy were to be no more thought of, they proceed to give us a Scheme for a Partition of it between the two Competitors, which they value themselves so much upon, as to tell us, 'twould puzzle a very wise Man to know which Part to chuse. But do they think us such Fools, as to believe 'tis in the Power of *England* to chuse which Part of the Alternative they will? Is it not plain to a Demonstration, that there is no Choice left? If the new Emperor should chuse *Spain* and the *Indies*, which way shall he come at them? Has he a great Fleet to transport him from *Italy* to *Spain*, when he has a mind to it? And if he had, while *Italy* is in *French* Hands, which it would be by this Partition, how could he get to it? How long will Men impose such gross Nonsense on the Nation? Let them not talk of Alternatives, or of making choice of this or that: Let them speak plain, and tell us, that *Spain* and the *Indies* shall remain to the Duke of *Anjou*, and that the Emperor must take what is left, or nothing. This is and must be their Meaning; and why don't they speak it out? Is it not because their Scheme won't bear to be set in its true light; and that they think People



ple won't be pleas'd to see Terms forc'd upon the Emperor, and the most valuable Parts of the *Spanish* Monarchy suffer'd to remain in *French* Hands? What is this but the Peace the *French* offer'd at the end of the *Ramillies* Campaign, which was reject'd by all the Allies with Scorn? And shall we now be taught to think That a good Peace, after so many and great Successes against the common Enemy, which so long ago nobody thought tolerable? Let them shew that was a good Peace then, or allow this is a very bad one now. 'Tis surprizing to see, that we who are without dispute most concern'd in the Restitution of *Spain* and the *Indies*, should be most willing, nay the only People that are willing, to make a Peace without them. What can the Meaning of this be, that we should be so very fond of ending so successful a War on such Terms, in contradiction to the declared Sense of our own Nation, and of all the Powers in Alliance with us? That the *Dutch* should be truer to our Interest than we are our selves, and should be so averse to making those Concessions to *France*, by which we should be the greatest Sufferers? The Sense of our own Nation unanimously exprest in Parliament, in all the Parliaments that have been since the War began till now, and the Concurrence of the whole Alliance in the same Sentiments, if they have any weight with us, ought to make us very much suspect the Wisdom or Honesty of those Men, who would infuse into us contrary Notions, and make us think that right, which all the World have hitherto thought exceeding wrong. It seems to me much more reasonable to condemn the present Opinions, which are the Sentiments of one part only of the Nation, and in which they stand alone, than to censure those

those which have been so universally receiv'd, and have all our Allies of their side; and for that Reason I should think all that has been advanc'd of late to betray us into an insecure Peace, ought to be rejected, tho' what they have to say in favour of it were a great deal more plausible than it is. Nothing can make it reasonable to take now a Peace, which it was not reasonable to take five Years ago, unless the Run of the War had been against us; and indeed, were we to judge of the Fortune of the War from these new Preliminaries, one would think there had been a strange Turn in it, since the former Articles were made: Nothing else can give a tolerable account for the prodigious Difference there is between them; and yet in Fact the War has gone as much in favour of us, as from these Articles one would suspect it had gone against. We have succeeded in every thing we have undertaken in *Flanders*, and been Losers no where, except in that part where some People thought the War ought chiefly to be push'd, and in the expedition to *Canada*, the Event of which was not known when these Articles first came abroad; but we had then Reason to think it would succeed, and were told it could not fail. Now from the Continuance of the same Success, we had Reason to hope for the Continuance of the same Preliminaries that had been at first agreed to: This can't but be the Sense of Men that think; this we are sure is the Sense of our Allies. And Monsieur *Buys* can tell us, the Great Pensionary, that Father of his Country, that perfect Master of the Arts, not the Tricks of Government, when he was asked this Summer on the part of *France*, on what Terms he was willing the Negotiations should be renewed, gravely answered, He saw no Reason  
the

the Allies had to depart from the Preliminaries, there having been no change in their Affairs, to make them of another Mind. This is the steady Conduct of the Chief M——r of the States, who is universally applauded for the wise Part he has acted in this whole Affair: And 'tis no great Complement to an *English* M——y, to suppose them less able to judge right; or less zealous for the common Interest of us and our Allies. For my part, I have that just Esteem for the Present M——y, that had I no other Argument for it, I should from their known Character be pretty well satisfy'd, that whatever Articles are given out, we can be in no danger of an ill Peace. Such a Peace as these Preliminaries promise, even the Old M——y, as bad as they are represented, would not have put upon us; much less can we reasonably entertain any Suspensions, that the New M——y have any such Intentions, who both by their Words and Actions have encourag'd the Nation to expect the greatest things from them: and any Terms, but what fully answer the Ends for which we began the War, will now doubly disappoint us, as contradicting not only our Hopes from so much Success, but the great Expectations rais'd of them. Can we think his M——y would take an insecure Peace, who have done so much towards a firm and lasting one? Can we give way to such a Thought of Men, who we are oblig'd by many Authentick Acts to believe have restor'd Credit? Men, who have corrected all the Corruptions and Abuses of the Government with the same Success? Men, who have not confin'd their Cares to our Home-Affairs, but have made every Part of the Alliance feel the Influence of their wise Administration? Can we suspect any Designs of an

ill Peace, when such Care is taken to cultivate a perfect good Understanding with our Friends? when the *Hague, Bruffels, Vienna, Turin, Barcelona*, have all had their Part in the blessed Effects of the late Change, and no one of them can complain they have been neglected? How can we doubt of a good War, or a better Peace, when all Places have been vigorously provided with fresh Generals and Ministers, who being Men of unblemish'd Reputation, and of great Ability, and equally fit for the Affairs of War and Peace, can't but have given new Life to our Allies, and confirm'd the Union, on which a good Peace entirely depends?

I should not forget to add, that the Court of *Hannover* in particular has not been forgot; all imaginable Assurances have been given them, but that of calling over the Successor, that their Interest would be taken due care of, and that by a M——r of such undoubted Credit, as gives no little weight to his Commission. And tho' some People may wonder that we dont hear how that Court have express'd their Satisfaction, no body from their Silence has the Authority to say the contrary. But what gives us still greater Assurance of the Intentions of the M——y to push the War with Vigour till they can obtain a good Peace, is that neither *England*, nor *Europe* it self, can find Work enough for these indefatigable Men. The new M——y extend their Cares to the new World, and have endeavour'd to wound the Enemy in too sensible a part, for any Man to think they can be secret Friends to them. And if the Design did not succeed, 'tis not the fault of the M——rs, who did all they could towards it, by the Preparations made for it, the great Quantities of Stores of all sorts, the Number of good Troops, and above all, by the Choice they



they made of a fit Person to command it, whose Zeal and Affection to the Q—— no body, that has heard his Name, can doubt of.

In short, what the new M——y have done, or endeavour'd to do, is enough to convince all impartial Men, that they are very different from the old ones; and therefore if we had any reason to fear an ill Peace then, we can have none now. And tho' they had done none of the great things I have hinted at, we can never suspect them as concerting a Peace upon such wretched Articles, without making two strange Suppositions, neither of which have in them the least degree of probability: We must suppose them very ungrateful to the Q——, and very regardless of themselves. Can we think Men, who have such great Obligations to her Majesty, whom she has so unexpectedly rais'd to the first Places in her Government, whom she has express'd so great a Value for, and honour'd in so singular a manner; can we think these Men can be guilty of so much Ingratitude, as to take any Measures inconsistent with the Safety of her Person, or the Reputation of her Government? Much less would they sully a Reign of so much Glory with the Disgrace of an ill Peace. But suppose the worst that can be, that these M——rs could be ungrateful to the Q——, have we the least reason to think them regardless of themselves? But that they must be to a great degree, before they can come into such Designs as their Enemies so freely impute to them. For what can be more hazardous for any M——y, under the Inspection of perpetual Parliaments, than to go into such Measures as must needs draw upon them the Resentments of the Nation, especially in an Affair of so much consequence; in the issue of which, as 'tis good or bad, the Prosperity or Ruine of us is involv'd,



and that without retrieve? for if this War end ill, 'tis next to an impossibility that another can begin well, or be long kept off. I know those who are disaffected to the M---y turn this Argument the other way, and make that a reason for their clapping up a Peace at any rate, which to me proves just the contrary. They say, 'tis necessary for them to have a Peace, and therefore they will have one. And perhaps it may be pretty necessary for them; that I shall not dispute: But I can't allow the Consequence. Those Ministers are very shallow Politicians, who consider nothing but what will serve the present Turn; 'tis the part of Wisdom to look forward: And Men who have a true Concern for their own Safety, will carefully weigh future Dangers, especially when not very remote, against present Inconveniencies: And Men less wise than the present M---y would be very loath to make a Peace, which the Nation would not lastingly have reason to acquiesce in. They that can suspect this of the present M---rs, must be very little acquainted with their Characters; For 'tis remarkable, that among the infinite good Qualities they are commended for, by those who by their Writings may be presum'd to be acquainted with them; the Chief M---r is particularly, and to a degree beyond what was ever said of any mortal Man before, celebrated for his great Penetration and Insight into things at a great distance, and of a very uncertain nature. There is nothing that happen'd from the first Years of this Reign to the late Impeachment inclusive, but what the secret History of *Arlus* assures us he foresaw; and in the History of the *Guiscard*-Plot, nothing less than *unlimited* foresight closes a long Train of admirable Vertues. Now if we may credit these Characters, nay, if half of them

be

be true, they can neither intend to hurt the Nation by an ill Peace, nor hurt it without intending it; for Men of so much Foresight can't but be aware even of the remote Consequences of such a Peace both to the Nation and themselves. And since the Mischief the Publick would receive by such Measures must in the event reach them too, had they no other Quality but Self-love, I should think we may be secure, the Mischief is not design'd. Great Men may be regardless of themselves to serve their Country, but wise ones won't easily hazard their own Safety, by going into desperate Measures, which can end in nothing but the Ruine of it. What a very ill Opinion now must Men have of the present M---y, if they can't be convinc'd by all these Arguments, that these Preliminaries are not genuine?

If any body will still maintain they are so, after all I have said to evince the contrary, there is but one Supposition upon which one can account for them; and that is, that they are publish'd to try the Pulse of the Nation upon so nice a Subject, which 'tis not amiss for the M---y to feel, before they determine. But first 'tis not very probable, that to betray the Nation into an ill Peace, they would publish such a pack of Articles, as must frighten all thinking People at first sight: And if all that the Town says of the cause of Count G----s his Disgrace be true, 'twas never the Design of the M---y that any such Articles should be publish'd; or if that be not true, the Publication of them must have been made to stir up in the Nation fresh Resentments against *France*, by letting People see, that they are not yet come to any sincere Intentions of consenting to a good Peace, notwithstanding the Advances they have in appearance made towards us, or rather we towards them. But I can't sus-  
pect

pect the present M——y have this Intention, since that would lay them open to the same Reproach which they know has been so unjustly thrown on their Predecessors, that they have a Design to perpetuate the War: Whereas I dare say, every body is at present satisfy'd, they are very sincerely inclin'd to a Peace; which they are in the greatest haste for, if one may judge by their Friends, who are so impatient for a Peace, that they can't bear the least check should be put to it, by any body's insisting on a good one. And from thence we may be sure, the M——y are not capable of doing any thing, that may create in People an aversion to what they are themselves so well inclin'd to: And that I think puts it past dispute, that these Articles do not come from them, and consequently are not genuine.

Some indeed, who are Friends to the M——y, and yet maintain that these Articles are genuine, do confess, that these Articles make but a very slender appearance in themselves; but then for our comfort they assure us, there are other very good ones in reserve. But how can that be? Why must we not know the good ones, if there be any such, as well as the bad? Why! because, it seems, we can't know them, but our Allies must know them too. And why, I pray, must they be conceal'd from our Allies? because they won't be pleas'd with them. And why not? There is but one possible reason for such a Management; and that is, that we intend to sacrifice their Interest to our own, against common Justice, and in direct Violation of the fundamental Articles of the Grand Alliance; by the seventh Article of which they all solemnly engage not to treat of Peace with the Enemy, unless jointly and with the common Advices of the other

ther Parties ; and that no Peace shall be made, unless a reasonable Satisfaction be procur'd for all, according to the Tenor of the other Articles. So that the Enemies of the new M——y pretend, these good Articles they give us hopes of, are to be good for our selves only, and not for our Allies ; and consequently, they are to be the Price of the greatest Injustice and Iniquity, purchas'd by the Blood and Treasure of our Friends, who have for these ten years stood firm to us ; for the last time, I doubt, if this be our Justice, this the Reward of their Fidelity. And upon these Terms honest Men will think no Articles can be good. But be that as it will, what Purpose will it serve, to conceal these Articles from our Allies ? Will they think there are no private Articles, because they are not told what they are ? No, just the contrary ; from the Scandalousness of the Articles they do see, they will certainly conclude there are others they are not let into. And 'tis a known Observation, *Quod tegitur, majus creditur esse Nefas.*

But the same ill-dispos'd Persons further say, that suppose we could for the present conceal from the Allies the Bargain we have made, and what it is that has induc'd the M——y to consent to such Preliminaries ; can they always be conceal'd ? And if any ill Effects are apprehended from their knowing them now, won't the same ill Effects follow, whenever they are known ? Are we afraid lest after the Example we have set, they should fall into private Tamperings with *France*, and try to make Terms for themselves, when they see we take so little Care of them ? And that the consequence of such separate Measures may be, that we may at last be left in the Lurch our selves, while *France* can make a cheaper Bargain somewhere else. Do we fear this might  
be



be the Case, if the Allies knew all? And can we think, we have not already done enough to justify their taking such a Course? Will not the Jealousie we have given them, have the same ill Effects in this respect, as the most certain Knowledge of all that has been doing could produce? But suppose we can ward off this Blow, and the Treaty we are upon should not be defeated by any of our Allies being before-hand with us, and treating for themselves; these Men say further, What can a Peace end in, let the Terms be what they will, that is founded in manifest Injustice, and built on the Disunion and Discontent of our Allies? What Terms can ballance the Inconvenience that must attend the disobliging those, on whose Assistance we must rely for the Performance of them? Thus it is a certain and undoubted Truth, that no Peace, be it e'er so good, can be a lasting one, if for the Performance of the Articles the Allies are not mutual Guarantees for each other; nothing else can hinder *France* from breaking any Treaty that may be made. But this is a Security, they say, we can't expect, if this Alliance end in Discord and Confusion, as it must do, if we are false to our Allies, and sell them to *France*, to purchase some seeming Advantages to our selves. They call 'em *seeming* Advantages, for that all the separate Promises of *France* must be: they can give us nothing to compensate the real Securities we have hitherto insisted on, but some Advantages of Commerce in the *Indies*, or some Ports in *Spain*: but every thing of this kind must be very precarious. *France* can give us nothing, which it won't be in their Power to take away at Pleasure; and that before we can have time to arm our selves, or make Alliances: besides that it will be in vain to think of finding new Allies, if the present

Alliance



Alliance end, as by these Articles 'tis like to do. If we consider how difficult and expensive it is, to subsist the small Garrison we have now at *Gibraltar*, we shall be soon convinc'd, 'tis a jest to think we can maintain our selves in any *Spanish* Port, if one or two should, to allure us, for the present be put into our hands. The distance we are at from them, will make it impossible to keep them any longer than *France* and *Spain* shall have a mind to it; and that we may be sure they won't have long: and all the Articles of this sort can only serve to draw us into the Danger and Expence of a Standing Army, without any service in this point at all from them.

All this is urg'd by the Enemies of the present M——y; and if these Articles that relate to matters nearer home are so precarious, much more must those be so, that respect any Settlement in the *West-Indies*. 'Tis impossible any Advantages can be yielded to us in those parts, which may not by the united Force of *France* and *Spain* be taken from us, before we can so much as know they are attempting it. And what reason have we to think they won't do, what is so much for their Interest, the first convenient opportunity they have? And shall we, for such Advantages, for Terms we can't maintain an hour after the Alliance is broke, disoblige our Friends, and make it impracticable for them to unite with us again, whenever our Safety shall make it necessary? But suppose *France* would keep their word with us, tho the very Supposition is ridiculous, what must be the Consequence of leaving our Allies in a weak and defenceless State? Won't *France* in a little time be taking the advantage we put into their hands, of invading one or other of them? And what part in that case shall *England* take? Shall we

be in condition to go into a new War? Can we expect a perfect Unity and Confidence in all the Members of a new Alliance? or shall we sit still, and suffer *Europe* to be over-run? And if we do, what is it we may expect for our pains? Won't it be a mighty Satisfaction to have *France* make us the Promise *Polyphemus* made *Ulysses*, when he was devouring his Companions, that as an Act of his great Goodness he will reserve us for the last Mortel? A great Comfort this indeed! and yet this is all we can expect from a Peace, that is bad for our Allies. This will be the sure effect of the secret good Articles, which, 'tis said, we are to have. No Peace can be good, tho' *Spain* it self were given up, that will not be lasting; no Peace can be lasting, that is made on precarious Terms; no Terms can be other than precarious, that leave the *French* sufficient Power to violate them when they will. *France* will always have Power to do this, if the Allies don't bring them down to the first Preliminaries, and mutually engage to maintain the Treaty that shall be made. Much less can such an Engagement be alone sufficient: and if it were, 'tis not to be hoped for, 'tis not possible to be had; if instead of the old Preliminaries, a scandalous Treaty be founded in Iniquity, and the Interest of our Allies be sacrific'd by us to some specious Articles for our selves, which yet at the bottom are good for nothing, and can never be maintain'd.

From all which I can't but conclude, that all talk of better Articles is mere Banter; and that consequently those we have seen can't be genuine, since by the Confession of those who are the Friends of the M——y, they make but a sad appearance by themselves. Upon the whole, I am fully persuaded that no M——y will ever submit to such Articles, till 'tis absolutely necessary; and

and that most certainly at present it is not, unless we have made a Necessity our selves, by pretending to think there is one ; which I own I am not without some fear of, lest the Jealousies rais'd in the Allies by the clandestine Steps that have been made towards a Peace, should have caus'd such a Disunion, as will make it impossible to carry on the War with the same Vigour we have hitherto. And if that be the Case, we are in a blessed State indeed, that we can neither continue the War as we shou'd, nor put a good End to it ; and it will be but small Comfort to inquire when 'tis too late, Who are the Men have brought us into it ? Which leads me to another great Inducement to believe, a Treaty will never be made upon these Articles.

For tho I were mistaken in my good Opinion of the M—y, and tho all the Arguments I have urg'd to shew these Articles cannot be genuine shou'd be inconclusive, yet we have a sure Refuge in the P———t, which may put us out of our Pain ; for it can't be thought the Q—— will conclude an Affair of so much Importance without their Advice ; and I believe 'twas never known that a P———t acted against the true Interest of the Nation in any great Affair, provided they were well inform'd of the true Nature of it. For which Reason I can't but wish, that both Houses had, in this respect, the same Advantage the Upper have, whole Happiness it is to have of their Body a noble Peer, who had the Honour to be Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary during the Negotiations at the *Hague* and *Gertruydenburg* ; a Person of that Application and Capacity, that he is perfectly Master of all the Parts of this Grand Affair, and of such known Honour and Integrity, that the House are sure they may depend on the Truth of what he says.

The

The clear and distinct Insight such a Member will be able to give the House, into all the Steps that have been taken on the other Side, and into the several Interests of our Allies, and the Reasons why they ought to be supported in them, gives me the greatest Assurance, that so great and wise a Body, having the Advantage of such good Information, will give into no Treaty, which shall be dishonourable, unsafe, and unjust; but will advise the insisting on such Terms, as will be to the entire Satisfaction of our Allies, from whence alone we can expect any lasting Security to our selves. Let others therefore amuse themselves with affected or real Fears, if they please; I can be in no Apprehensions of an ill Peace, while I consider the Wisdom of the Present M——y, or the Virtue of a *British* Parliament.

*Multa virum virtus animo, multusque recurjat  
Gentis Honoros. ———*

A good Peace can never come too soon, nor a bad one too late; and I can't but hope that honest Men of all Denominations are of the same Mind, and that nobody will interpret the M——y's pacific Intentions to an ill Sense, or suspect that the Representative of the Nation is capable of consenting to any thing which is not truly for its Interest, and for the Glory of the Prince they have the Honour to advise,

F I N I S.









